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NOTE

RESTORING THE POWER OF THE CONVENING AUTHORITY
TO ADJUST SENTENCES
Jacob R . Weaver*
In 2013, Congress abrogated the power of certain military officers to reduce
court-martial sentences, thereby eliminating a military defendant’s best hope
for efficient and effective relief from common legal errors in the military justice system . While the overhaul of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) in 2016 promised significant reform, it ultimately failed to substantially reduce common legal errors . This Note analyzes how the 2013 and 2016
reforms have combined to prevent military defendants from receiving timely
and adequate relief . In light of this analysis, this Note suggests an amendment to the UCMJ that would restore to certain officers a limited authority to
reduce sentences based on legal errors . Such a reform ultimately addresses the
core concerns that led to the 2013 revision while simultaneously providing an
efficient and effective remedy for common legal errors, furthering the UCMJ’s
aim of promoting justice and maintaining good order and discipline .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................614
I.
REFORMING THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM ...............................616
A. The Pre-Reform Military Justice System ................................616

* Ensign, United States Navy Individual Ready Reserve. J.D. Candidate, University of
Michigan Law School, May 2021; B.A. in History, Hillsdale College, May 2018. The opinions in
this Note represent the personal views of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or views of the Department of Defense or its components.
I would like to thank Matthew Catallo for his substantial assistance and support. I also
want to thank my parents, Jeff and Sharon Weaver, for their continued encouragement, as well
as Captain Andrew House and Defense Service Office North for an incredible internship during the summer of 2019. Additionally, I want to thank Professor Sherman Clark, Elizabeth
Helpling, and Brian Weber for providing me valuable feedback. Finally, I would like to thank
Executive Notes Editor Kate Markey and the rest of the Michigan Law Review’s members for
their exceptional guidance throughout the publication process.
I dedicate this work to my late grandfather George R. White, who inspired my passion for
military service.

613

614

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:613

B. United States v. Wilkerson, the 2012 SAPR Report, and
Calls for Reform........................................................................618
1. United States v . Wilkerson ...............................................618
2. 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey ............619
3. Calls for Reform................................................................619
C. The 2013 and 2016 UCMJ Reforms........................................620
II.
INADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN THE
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM .............................................................625
A. Continuing Problems in the Military Justice System ............625
1. Pretrial Punishment .........................................................625
2. Posttrial Confinement Conditions ................................. 626
3. Trial Counsel Misconduct at Sentencing ......................628
B. Convening Authority Remedies Before 2013 .........................630
C. Post-2016 UCMJ Reforms: Courts-Martial and CCAs as
a Remedy ...................................................................................631
1. Pretrial Punishment .........................................................631
2. Posttrial Confinement Conditions .................................633
3. Trial Counsel Misconduct at Sentencing ......................635
4. Length of Posttrial Legal Action .....................................636
III.
A NEW EXCEPTION TO UCMJ ARTICLE 60A.................................637
A. Restoring the Most Efficient and Effective Remedy for
Legal Errors ...............................................................................638
1. An Efficient and Effective Remedy................................. 639
2. Checks on Convening Authority Discretion ................ 642
B. Responses to Counterarguments ............................................. 645
1. Too Much Convening Authority Discretion ................645
2. Other Avenues for Relief .................................................647
3. Too Little Convening Authority Discretion ................. 648
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................650
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, United States v . Wilkerson, a case involving military sexual assault, ignited national debate regarding the adequacy of the military justice
system. 1 The debate led to revisions in how the military handled posttrial
1. David Classen, Military Justice Under Fire: Commanders’ “Convening Authority”
Power, BENCH & BAR MINN., Nov. 2013 (discussing United States v . Wilkerson); see, e .g ., Evan
Puschak, ‘All for Nothing’: The Military, Sexual Assault, and the Search for Justice, MSNBC
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processing. 2 Among other changes, the 2013 reforms removed the convening
authority’s power to reduce certain court-martial sentences. 3 In the civilian
world, these changes were hailed as a victory for victims, especially survivors
of sexual assault. 4
However, the 2013 reforms warrant reevaluation in the wake of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) overhaul in 2016, which took effect on
January 1, 2019. 5 The 2013 reforms limited the convening authority’s power
to reduce sentences, which had been an effective remedy for common problems that plagued the military justice system, including pretrial punishment,
posttrial confinement conditions, and trial counsel misconduct at sentencing. 6 The 2016 reforms failed to address these common issues. 7 Consequently, the 2013 and 2016 UCMJ amendments combined to limit
servicemembers’ ability to obtain remedies for legal errors that occur before,
during, and after their prosecutions.
In order to reduce this substantial burden on servicemembers, Congress
should add a provision to the UCMJ that restores the power of convening
authorities in all cases to reduce sentences of confinement based on legal errors, subject to two restrictions: (1) a convening authority’s staff judge advocate must provide a written review and recommendation before the
convening authority acts, and (2) any reduction in confinement over fifty-six
days is subject to review by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the
branch concerned.
Part I of this Note provides historical background for the 2013 and 2016
UCMJ reforms. Part II analyzes continuing problems in the military justice
system and servicemembers’ current options to remedy legal errors. Part III
offers a revision to the UCMJ, discussing the benefits of the modification
and addressing several critiques that the proposal might face.

(Mar. 12, 2013, 10:27 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/all-nothing-the-militarysexual-assau [https://perma.cc/H2RJ-4GEJ]; House Panel Moves to Curb Military Sexual Assaults, CBS NEWS (May 22, 2013, 5:12 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-panelmoves-to-curb-military-sexual-assaults/ [https://perma.cc/BSG8-JJRJ]; Juana Summers, Kimberly Hanks Takes on Air Force, POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2013 11:54 PM), https://www.politico.com
/story/2013/09/accuser-kimberly-hanks-takes-on-air-force-096510
[https://perma.cc/29PY4R4M].
2 . See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
secs. 1701–09, 127 Stat. 672, 952–65 (2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C.).
3. Id . sec. 1702(b), § 832(b), 127 Stat. at 955.
4 . See, e .g ., Policy Achievements, PROTECT OUR DEFS., https://www.protectour
defenders.com/policy-achievements/ [https://perma.cc/3FMM-2UFL].
5. Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, sec. 5542, § 801, 130 Stat. 2894,
2967 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
6. For an overview of the 2013 reforms and other proposed reforms, see generally David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for Reform, 73 A.F. L.
REV. 193 (2015).
7. For a detailed overview of the 2016 reforms, see David A. Schlueter, Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1 (2017).
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REFORMING THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

The 2013 and 2016 amendments to the UCMJ drastically altered the
structure of the military justice system. This Part provides a brief overview of
the military justice system and convening authority power, discusses what
prompted the 2013 and 2016 reforms, and concludes with an assessment of
the reforms as they relate to convening authority power.
A. The Pre-Reform Military Justice System
Much like prosecutors in the civilian criminal justice system, officers are
the epicenter of the military justice system. 8 However, officers have wider
discretion than civilian prosecutors. 9 For instance, the UCMJ allows for nonjudicial punishments—minor punishments that may be imposed without the
intervention of a court-martial, the military equivalent of a civilian trial
court. 10 Superior officers might also choose, in lieu of a court-martial, to
simply discharge the individual from the service through administrative proceedings. 11
Finally, certain officers called “convening authorities” 12 maintain the
power to convene one of three types of courts-martial: a summary courtmartial, a special court-martial, and a general court-martial. 13 The type of
court-martial dictates the type of punishment that may be imposed if the
member panel, the factfinder in courts-martial, finds the accused guilty. 14
The general court-martial, which will be the focus of this Note, is the equivalent of a civilian felony trial. 15 Today, such a court-martial consists of eight
panel members and a military judge, though the accused may opt for a bench
trial. 16
In addition to selecting the type of court-martial, convening authorities
have broad control over court-martial proceedings. In fact, before the 2013
and 2016 revisions, the convening authority oversaw nearly every portion of
a general court-martial—from initiating an investigation to selecting a
member panel to approving the court-martial results. 17 This broad control
included the ability to alter a court-martial’s findings and the imposed sen-

8. Classen, supra note 1, at 23–24.
9. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 207–09; see infra Section I.A.
10. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES,
at II-28 (2019) [hereinafter MCM 2019] (Rule 306); Schlueter, supra note 6, at 199, 207.
11. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 201.
12. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-56 (Rule 504(a)).
13 . Id . at II-13 (Rule 201(f)).
14 . Id .
15. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 45.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 816(b)(1), (3) (2018).
17. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 199–204.
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tence. 18 Specifically, Article 60 of the UCMJ provided the convening authority with substantial discretion to set aside findings of guilt or reduce the degree of the charge. 19 It stipulated that convening authorities maintained
complete authority to “approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence in whole or in part.” 20
Scholars and servicemembers alike argued that these powers were fundamental to the military justice system. Officers, they reasoned, are directly
responsible for ensuring the good order and discipline of the armed forces
and are in the best position to understand the specific needs and disciplinary
issues of those they command. 21 Moreover, convening authorities are not
without legal assistance during the court-martial process. Staff judge advocates, lawyers trained in military law who are the principal legal advisors of a
command, 22 advise convening authorities throughout the proceedings. 23 For
instance, prior to the 2013 reforms, the UCMJ demanded that the convening
authority’s staff judge advocate assess the record of trial and any material
submitted to the convening authority by the defendant. 24 After the staff
judge advocate completed this assessment, she provided a written report to
the convening authority that detailed the results of the trial, including the
findings, the sentence, and any sentencing-authority clemency recommendation. 25 The report also included the staff judge advocate’s recommendation
regarding clemency and sentence reduction. 26 Still, the convening authority
18. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2012) (amended 2016); JOINT
SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, at II-152 (2012)
[hereinafter MCM 2012] (Rule 1107(b)(1)). Modification of findings and sentences was “a
matter of command prerogative involving the sole discretion of the convening authority.” 10
U.S.C. § 860(c)(1) (2012) (amended 2016).
19 . Id . § 860; MCM 2012, supra note 18, at II-152 (Rule 1107(b)). It should be noted
that convening authorities very rarely offered such sweeping clemency. In fact, one study of
convening-authority power within the Air Force found that convening authorities overturned
court-martial convictions in only forty of 3,713 cases and that over half of these cases involved
minor offenses such as underage drinking. Matthew Burris, Thinking Slow About Sexual Assault in the Military, 23 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 21, 34 (2015).
20. 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2) (2012) (amended 2016).
21 . See, e .g ., Schlueter, supra note 6, at 207–08; Erin Delmore, Military Chiefs Fight for
Commander Control of Sexual Assault Cases, MSNBC (June 4, 2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.
msnbc.com/andrea-mitchell/military-chiefs-fight-commander-control-o
[https://perma.cc
/TPE7-5CG6].
22. Staff judge advocates might be compared to in-house counsels. See MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-2 (Rule 103(18)); see also Schlueter, supra note 6, at 208.
23. As the Manual for Courts-Martial states, “Convening authorities shall at all times
communicate directly with their staff judge advocates in matters relating to the administration
of military justice.” MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-7 (Rule 105(a)).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 860(d) (2012) (amended 2016). The material that the defense could
submit was not limited by the rules of evidence. MCM 2012, supra note 18, at II-148 (Rule
1105(b)(2)).
25. MCM 2012, supra note 18, at II-150 (Rule 1106(d)).
26 . Id . The defendant then had a chance to respond to the staff judge advocate’s recommendation. Id . at II-151 (Rule 1106(f)(4)).
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maintained absolute and final authority irrespective of her staff judge advocate’s advice. 27
B. United States v. Wilkerson, the 2012 SAPR Report, and Calls for Reform
The convening authority’s broad discretion came under public scrutiny
in 2013. In particular, Wilkerson and the Pentagon’s 2012 Workplace and
Gender Relations Survey led to calls for reform both inside and outside Congress.
1.

United States v. Wilkerson

In April 2012, Kimberly Hanks, a civilian contractor, accused Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkerson of sexual assault. 28 Wilkerson was
charged with two violations of UCMJ Article 120 (Rape and Sexual Assault
Generally) and three violations of UCMJ Article 133 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman). 29 Although the convening authority, Lieutenant General Craig Franklin, believed there was little evidence to corroborate
Hanks’ claims, he sent the case to a general court-martial. 30 Wilkerson pled
not guilty to all charges, but, in November 2012, a five-member panel convicted Wilkerson on all counts. 31 The member panel sentenced him to dismissal from the Air Force and confinement for one year. 32
Wilkerson then requested clemency from the convening authority, submitting more than ninety letters from colleagues, friends, and family as support. 33 The staff judge advocate reviewed these submissions as well as the
trial record, but he recommended that the convening authority uphold the
verdict. 34 On his own review, however, Franklin decided that the evidence
did not prove Wilkerson’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 With this con-

27. See 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2) (2012) (amended 2016).
28. Memo Gives Insight into Sex-Assault Clemency, MIL. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Memo Gives Insight], https://www.militarytimes.com/2013/04/13/memo-gives-insightinto-sex-assault-clemency/ [https://perma.cc/KE5P-LWMF].
29. 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 933 (2012) (amended 2016); United States v. Wilkerson, General
Court-Martial Order No. 10 (Headquarters, Third Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany, Feb. 26,
2013) [hereinafter GCMO 10].
30. Memo Gives Insight, supra note 28.
31. Id.; GCMO 10, supra note 29.
32. GCMO 10, supra note 29, at 2.
33. Classen, supra note 1, at 23.
34. See id. at 24.
35. Memo Gives Insight, supra note 28. The law did not impose any obligation on Franklin to explain his reasons for overturning the conviction. Id. Due to public outcry, however, he
submitted a six-page memo to the Air Force Secretary on March 12, 2013 that detailed his logic. Id. Franklin listed eighteen facts that he believed militated against Wilkerson’s conviction.
Id.
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clusion, Franklin exercised his Article 60 power as the convening authority
to overturn Wilkerson’s conviction in February 2013. 36
2.

2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey

The Pentagon’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office released
its 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey in 2013 at nearly the same
time that Wilkerson reached the public eye. 37 Among servicemembers who
responded to the survey, 23% of women and 4% of men stated that they had
experienced some form of unwanted sexual contact during their time in the
military. 38 In 2012 alone, a reported 6.1% of women and 1.2% of men—an
estimated 26,000 servicemembers in total—faced some form of unwanted
sexual contact. 39 Of the women who faced unwanted sexual contact, 67% did
not report the contact to a military authority. 40 The three most common reasons for not filing a report included not wanting anyone to know (70%), feeling uncomfortable making a report (66%), and not believing the military
would keep the report confidential (51%). 41 The pervasiveness of sexual assault and the lack of reporting ignited a political firestorm. 42
3.

Calls for Reform

The combination of Wilkerson and the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey led to intense political debate. Reformers quickly set their
sights on Article 60, the provision that allowed Franklin to overturn Wilkerson’s conviction. They argued that because convening authorities could
overturn or commute verdicts and reduce sentences, there was no guarantee
that justice would be served. 43 Consequently, servicemembers were skeptical

36 . Id .; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2012) (amended
2016).
37. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., DEP’T OF DEF., 2012 WORKPLACE AND GENDER
RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS (2013), http://www.ncdsv.org
/images/DOD_2012-Workplace-and-Gender-Relations-Survey-of-Active-Duty-Members_315-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY3W-J8N7].
38 . Id . at 1–4 (the survey yielded a 24 percent weighted response rate).
39 . Id . at 1–2; Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking the Chain of Command Culture:
A Call for an Independent and Impartial Investigative Body to Curb Sexual Assaults in the Military, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 342 (2014).
40. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., supra note 37, at 3.
41 . Id .
42. Schlueter, supra note 7, at 13; Jennifer Steinhauer, Reports of Military Sexual Assault
Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-ofmilitary-sexual-assault-rise-sharply.html [https://perma.cc/926H-L8Q2].
43 . See Suzanne Simms, Comment, Revision of Article 60 and the Military Convening
Authority’s Clemency Power: An Alternative to the Enacted Legislation, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 301,
315–18 (2014). In her December 11, 2014 speech on the Senate floor, Senator Gillibrand suggested that servicemembers did not believe that justice would be served. 160 CONG. REC. S6587
(daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (statement of Sen. Gillibrand).
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of the military justice system. 44 On this view, the military justice system stifled reports and facilitated a culture of sexual assault. 45 These concerns were
paired with arguments about the oddity of allowing an individual who took
no part in a court-martial to overturn the decision of a member panel. 46
Commentators also questioned why an individual untrained in the law held
the final authority to assess court-martial verdicts for legal error and determine whether a trial counsel, the rough equivalent of a civilian prosecutor,
met her burden of proof. 47
Based on these arguments, reformers called for the complete elimination
of convening authority posttrial powers. 48 Even the Department of Defense
agreed that Congress should eliminate convening authorities’ ability to overturn verdicts, though it hoped Congress would allow convening authorities
to retain the ability to reduce sentences. 49
C. The 2013 and 2016 UCMJ Reforms
In May 2013, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced the Military Justice
Improvement Act. 50 While Congress did not pass the proposed Act, it incor-

44. Simms, supra note 43, at 311, 315.
45. For instance, Senator Claire McCaskill, one of the first congresspeople to broach the
subject, suggested that allowing the convening authority to reduce sentences and overturn
convictions prevents justice for survivors and leads to a culture that condones sexual assault.
Memo Gives Insight, supra note 28; see also Jane C. Timm, McCaskill Challenges Military Justice
System Over Sexual Assault Case, MSNBC (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:51 AM), http://www.msnbc.com
/morning-joe/mccaskill-challenges-military-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/HQE4-X7R9].
Representative Jackie Speier echoed this sentiment. Referencing Wilkerson, she stated,
I think it’s clear that the chain of command chose the future of one soldier over
the integrity of the entire Air Force. Against any measure of better judgment, they
thumbed their noses at the victim, her family, and justice in general. This closed
system of power is truly amazing in its arrogance.
Summers, supra note 1. For a critique of the view that convening authority power led to a culture of sexual assault, see generally Burris, supra note 19.
46. As Senator McCaskill argued, “A commander who has not listened to the testimony
should not be able to unilaterally overturn a jury verdict or change an offender’s sentence
without explanation.” Chris Carroll, Hagel: Change UCMJ to Deny Commanders Ability to
Overturn Verdicts, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.stripes.com/hagel-changeucmj-to-deny-commanders-ability-to-overturn-verdicts-1.215629 [https://perma.cc/WZ38CUZD].
47. Simms, supra note 43, 315–16.
48 . See, e .g ., Statement: Protect Our Defenders Calls UCMJ Proposed Article 60 Reform
Insufficient, PROTECT OUR DEFS. (Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.protectourdefenders.com
/statement-protect-our-defenders-calls-ucmj-proposed-article-60-reform-insufficient/
[https:// perma.cc/SBV7-45XV].
49. The ability to reduce sentences, the department argued, allowed convening authorities to effectively negotiate plea bargains and reduce harsh sentences. Carroll, supra note 46.
50. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill’s core object was the removal of commanders’
prosecutorial discretion and authority. Greg Rustico, Note, Overcoming Overcorrection: To-
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porated major elements of Gillibrand’s legislation into the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (2014 NDAA). 51 Consistent with the
Military Justice Improvement Act, the 2014 NDAA nearly eliminated convening authorities’ ability to act on the findings and sentence of a courtmartial. 52
The 2014 NDAA categorized crimes into “qualifying” and “nonqualifying” offenses. Under the NDAA, a qualifying offense was any offense for
which (1) the maximum punishment did not include a sentence greater than
two years’ confinement, and (2) the actual sentence imposed did not include
a dismissal, a punitive discharge, or more than six months’ confinement. 53
The definition of “qualifying offense” explicitly excluded all sexual offenses
outlined in UCMJ Articles 120, 120b, and 125. 54 Nonqualifying offenses, on
the other hand, included any offense that did not meet the criteria of a qualifying offense. 55 The law additionally allowed the Secretary of Defense to designate otherwise qualifying offenses as nonqualifying offenses. 56 Roughly, the
category of qualifying offenses encompassed minor military crimes, which
often result in a sentence of no more than six months’ confinement and no
punitive discharge or dismissal, whereas the category of nonqualifying offenses contained civilian crimes, which usually carry a sentence of greater
than six months’ confinement, a punitive discharge or dismissal, or both. 57
Under the Act, a convening authority could only modify the findings of
a member panel in cases involving qualifying offenses. 58 For any nonqualifying offense, convening authorities could no longer set aside findings of guilt,
dismiss charges, or reduce charges to lesser included offenses. 59 Moreover, if

wards Holistic Military Sexual Assault Reform, 102 VA. L. REV. 2027, 2060–61 (2016). Though
the bill retained commanders’ ability to issue nonjudicial punishment, it placed the power to
prosecute into the hands of senior judge advocates. Id . In addition to removing commanders’
pretrial prosecutorial authority, the bill also eliminated the entirety of commanders’ posttrial
authority under Article 60. See S. 967 § 6.
51 . See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-66, secs. 1701–53, 127 Stat. 672, 950–1005 (2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
52 . See id . sec. 1702(b), § 832(b), 127 Stat. at 954.
53 . Id .
54 . Id .
55 . See id .
56 . Id .
57. Minor military crimes include offenses such as “[c]ontempt or disrespect to other
noncommissioned or petty officer” and “[d]ereliction in the performance of duties . . .
[t]hrough neglect or culpable inefficiency,” which carry a maximum sentence of three months’
confinement. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at IV-26, IV-28. Civilian crimes include drunken operation of a vehicle, which carries a maximum punishment of a dishonorable discharge and
eighteen months’ confinement, and involuntary manslaughter, which carries a maximum punishment of a dishonorable discharge and ten years’ confinement. Id . at IV-70 to -71, IV-79 to 80.
58. National Defense Authorization Act sec. 1702(b), § 832(b), 127 Stat. at 955–58.
59 . See id.
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the convening authority chose to act on the verdict of a qualifying offense,
the law demanded that the convening authority provide a written explanation for her actions. 60
The 2014 NDAA also cabined the convening authority’s power to act on
sentences. The law forbade the convening authority from disapproving,
commuting, or suspending any part of an adjudged sentence if that sentence
included confinement for more than six months or a punitive discharge or
dismissal. 61 Congress provided two narrow exceptions to this rule: a convening authority could reduce such a sentence if (1) the trial counsel recommended such action based on the defendant’s substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another servicemember, or (2) reducing the
sentence was necessary to enforce a pretrial agreement. 62
In 2016, Congress passed a second round of reforms. 63 The 2016
amendments were the most extensive changes to the UCMJ since their initial
adoption in 1950. 64 Congress added sixty-seven new articles and amended
ninety-six existing articles. 65 Due to these sweeping changes, the revised
UCMJ did not take effect until January 1, 2019. 66
The 2016 reforms included further revision of posttrial procedures. In
an effort to clarify and simplify the military justice system’s complex posttrial process, Congress divided Article 60 into four sections: Article 60, Article
60a, Article 60b, and Article 60c. 67 Article 60 now requires military judges to
send a “Statement of Trial Results” to the convening authority immediately
after trial, and it explicitly permits military judges to hear posttrial motions. 68

60 . Id .
61 . Id . Dismissals are reserved for officers, as they cannot be punitively discharged. For
enlisted servicemembers, punitive discharges include dishonorable and bad conduct discharges. UMAR MOULTA-ALI & SIDATH VIRANGA PANANGALA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43928,
VETERANS’ BENEFITS: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY DISCHARGES ON BASIC ELIGIBILITY app. at 18
(2015).
62. National Defense Authorization Act sec. 1702(b), § 832(b), 127 Stat. at 955–58.
63. Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2894 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
64. Schlueter, supra note 7, at 8–9.
65 . Id . at 9.
66. Military Justice Act sec. 5542, § 801, 127 Stat. at 2967–68 (mandating that the president implement the regulations by January 1, 2019); Schlueter, supra note 7, at 115.
67. This revision sought to “mirror procedures for federal criminal proceedings and to
simplify and expedite processing of court-martial convictions.” 10 U.S.C. §§ 860–860c (2018);
Schlueter, supra note 7, at 75.
68. Military Justice Act sec. 5321, § 860(a), 130 Stat. at 2924; Schlueter, supra note 7, at
75. Before these amendments, no UCMJ provision authorized military judges to conduct
posttrial hearings, though the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) allowed judges to exercise
such power. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2012) (amended 2016) (containing no statutory provision authorizing posttrial hearings), with id . § 860(b) (2018) (adding new statutory authority to
allow for posttrial motions); see also JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-
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Articles 60a and 60b generally retained the 2013 reforms’ scheme regarding the alteration of findings and sentences. 69 Article 60a forbids convening authorities from altering court-martial findings in which (1) the
maximum sentence of confinement for any offense of which the accused is
found guilty is more than two years; (2) the maximum sentence of confinement imposed, running consecutively, is more than six months; (3) the sentence imposed includes a dismissal, dishonorable discharge, or bad conduct
discharge; or (4) the accused was found guilty of a rape or sexual assault. 70
As for sentences, Article 60a prohibits convening authorities from reducing,
commuting, or suspending any sentence that contains a period of confinement for all offenses involved, running consecutively, that is greater than six
months. 71 A convening authority also cannot alter a sentence that includes a
dismissal, dishonorable discharge, bad conduct discharge, or sentence of
death. 72 The new provisions also limited exceptions to the sentencereduction scheme to cases in which (1) the military judge, in the Statement
of Trial Results, recommends that the convening authority suspend the sentence, or (2) the trial counsel recommends a reduction based on the defendant’s substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another
individual. 73 Any changes to sentences or court-martial findings must be accompanied by a written statement outlining the convening authority’s reasoning. 74 Overall, these changes continued the 2013 reforms’ trend of
circumscribing the convening authority’s discretion to modify court-martial
findings and sentences.
Though it will be some time before statistics that relate to the 2016 reforms are available, ample Department of Defense statistics on sexual assault
collected after the 2013 reforms exist. In 2015, the first year in which all 2013
reforms were implemented, 75 sexual assault reports in the military decreased
by 1%. 76 This is a drastic shift, considering that fiscal years 2013 and 2014
saw a 53% and 11% increase in sexual assault reports, respectively. 77 The rate

MARTIAL UNITED STATES, at II-146 (2016) [hereinafter MCM 2016] (Rule 1102) (allowing military judges to convene posttrial hearings despite no statutory authorization).
69. 10 U.S.C. §§ 860a–860b (2018).
70. Congress enacted this provision in direct response to Wilkerson. Id . § 860a; see supra
Section I.B.
71. 10 U.S.C. § 860a.
72 . Id .
73. Military Justice Act sec. 5322, § 860(a), 130 Stat at 2924; Schlueter, supra note 7, at
75–78.
74. Schlueter, supra note 7, at 78.
75 . See DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 18,
app. H (2015) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2014].
76. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 7
(2016) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2015].
77. DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2014, supra note 75, at 6.
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of conversion from confidential reports to public reports 78 also increased
from 14% in 2013 to 21% in 2015, 79 suggesting that survivors had increased
confidence that the military would properly handle their case and that they
would not face retaliation by those in their command. By 2016, the Department of Defense found that rates of sexual assault decreased to 4.3% among
active-duty women and 0.6% among active-duty men, corresponding to
roughly 14,900 servicemembers. 80 The data also suggested that approximately one in three servicemembers chose to report, up from one in four in 2014
and one in ten in 2012. 81 Unfortunately, 2018 data (the most recent Department of Defense study) suggests that sexual assaults increased to an estimated total of 20,500 instances, while reporting rates remained steady. 82
However, conversions from restricted to unrestricted reports increased to
23%. 83
It should be noted that these reports do not analyze how the 2013 reforms to convening authority power affected sexual assault in the military
apart from the many other Department of Defense reforms. 84 As the 2016
reforms take effect, researchers should attempt to isolate and analyze how
specific reforms affect sexual assault and reporting rates, a project that would
provide Congress invaluable information as it considers future reforms. Regardless, it appears that the 2013 reforms in combination with other efforts
by the Department of Defense, though not perfect, have made a positive impact on reducing sexual assault in the military.
What these reforms failed to achieve, however, is as important as what
they achieved. Specifically, they failed to address many of the continuing
problems in the military justice system that lead to systemic legal errors
while all but eliminating the most efficient and effective remedy 85 available

78. The survivor can choose to make their report “restricted” or “unrestricted.” Reporting Options, U.S. DEP’T DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, https://www
.sapr.mil/reporting-options [https://perma.cc/D89D-3PHL]. Restricted reports remain confidential, are not investigated by the military, and limit a survivor’s access to support services.
Restricted Reporting, U.S. DEP’T DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE,
https://www.sapr.mil/restricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/993N-C4RW]. In contrast, unrestricted reports are public, are investigated by the military, and provide broad access to support
services. Unrestricted Reporting, U.S. DEP’T DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE,
https://www.sapr.mil/unrestricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/7ND2-58TK].
79. DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2015, supra note 76, at 11.
80. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 9
(2017) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2016].
81 . Id . at 19; DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2014, supra note 75, at 8.
82. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 3
(2019) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018].
83 . Id . at 5–6.
84. See DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY 2014, supra note 75, app. H for a list of reforms.
85. As the Manual for Courts-Martial states, “The purpose of military law is to promote
justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote effi-
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for such errors—convening authority posttrial sentence-reduction power.
This has left courts-martial and the military courts of criminal appeals
(CCAs) to fill the void.
II.

INADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM

Though the 2016 reforms sought to increase due process procedures for
defendants, legal errors, including violations of defendants’ statutory and
constitutional rights, still occur. 86 By taking away the convening authority’s
power to revise sentences, the 2013 reforms removed the most efficient and
effective way to resolve many common legal errors that the 2016 reforms
failed to alleviate. As a result, servicemembers are forced to seek remedies
exclusively in the courts-martial and CCAs.
This Part assesses several continuing problems within the military justice system and analyzes the convening authority’s role in resolving those
problems before the 2013 reforms. It then outlines a servicemember’s current options for relief and explains why these options are inadequate.
A. Continuing Problems in the Military Justice System
The unique nature of the military justice system results in many problems that neither the 2013 nor the 2016 UCMJ revisions effectively resolved.
This Section examines three errors that often occur in the military justice
system: pretrial punishment, posttrial confinement conditions, and trial
counsel misconduct at sentencing.
1.

Pretrial Punishment

The UCMJ allows certain officers to impose pretrial restraints, ranging
from restricted liberty to physical confinement, on an individual charged
with an offense as long as probable cause exists. 87 However, Article 13 and
the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM)—regulations promulgated by the
president that implement the UCMJ—strictly prohibit the imposition of pretrial punishment. 88 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) 89

ciency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national
security of the United States.” MCM 2019, supra note 10, at I-1 (emphasis added) (3. Nature
and Purpose of Military Law).
86. Schlueter, supra note 7, at 53.
87. 10 U.S.C. § 810; MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-21 (Rule 304(a)). Any officer may
impose pretrial restraint on enlisted personnel if there is probable cause to believe that “(1)
[a]n offense triable by court-martial has been committed; (2) [t]he person to be restrained
committed it; and (3) [t]he restraint ordered is required by the circumstances.” MCM 2019,
supra note 10, at II-21 (Rule 304(b)–(c)). Similar rules apply to the imposition of pretrial restraint on civilians and officers, though only a commanding officer under whose authority the
accused acts may order pretrial restraint.
88. 10 U.S.C. § 813; MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-21 to -23 (Rule 304).
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has held that such punishment denies an accused due process. 90 The MCM
defines “pretrial punishment” fairly broadly, including forcing the accused to
engage in punitive duty hours, training, or labor. 91 The CAAF has also suggested that, though not a per se violation, confining the accused with posttrial prisoners may result in an Article 13 violation, 92 leading the service
branches to enact various regulatory prohibitions on such confinement. 93
Still, pretrial restraint often devolves into punishment, sometimes intentionally and sometimes accidentally. 94 For instance, in United States v . Cruz, the
commander sought to publicly humiliate and degrade the individuals involved by arresting and searching them in front of a formation of 1,200 soldiers. 95 In other cases, pretrial confinement in civilian facilities has
inadvertently devolved into pretrial punishment. 96
2.

Posttrial Confinement Conditions

Posttrial confinement is a second area of military justice rife with errors.
It should first be noted that the 2016 reforms dealt with one significant cause
of legal errors that occurred during posttrial confinement: Article 12. Before

89. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) is established by Congress under Article I and is administered by the executive branch, receiving appeals from the CCAs.
James E. Baker, Is Military Justice Sentencing on the March? Should It Be? And If So, Where
Should It Head? Court-Martial Sentencing Process, Practice, and Issues, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 72,
73–74 (2014). Its members are appointed by the president and serve fifteen-year terms. Id . All
members are civilians. Id . Like Article III courts of appeals, litigants may appeal CAAF rulings
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id .
90. United States v. Heard, 3 M.J. 14, 20 (C.M.A. 1977). The Court of Military Appeals
(renamed the U.S. Court of Military Appeals in 1968) was established by the original Uniform
Code of Military Justice enacted in 1950 and served as the highest military appellate body until
1994, when Congress redesignated it as the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. About the
Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR ARMED FORCES, https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf
/about.htm [https://perma.cc/E37G-EGUP]. For the remainder of this Note, the Court of Military Appeals, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces will be treated under the single title “Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces” or
“CAAF.”
91. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-23 (Rule 304(f)).
92. Timothy Riley, Note, Protecting Servicemembers from Illegal Pretrial Punishment: A
Survey of Article 13, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Caselaw, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2006, at 36,
43.
93 . See, e .g ., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE ARMY CORRECTIONS SYSTEM, ARMY
REGULATION (AR) 190-47, at 69 (2006) (“Pretrial prisoners will not reside, work, or be permitted to mingle with prisoners who have been sentenced to confinement.”).
94. For a broad overview of pretrial punishment issues, see generally Riley, supra note
92.
95. United States v. Cruz, 25 M.J. 326, 328 (C.M.A. 1987).
96 . See, e .g ., United States v. Zarbatany, 70 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (allowing confinement credit based on conditions in the civilian confinement facility). For an overview of pretrial confinement legal errors associated with civilian confinement facilities, see Marc Wm.
Zelnick, Managing an Installation’s Utilization of a Civilian Confinement Facility: A Primer,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 2014, at 6.
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the 2016 reforms, Article 12 prevented the military from confining military
members with any foreign national. 97 This especially created problems in civilian confinement facilities that often held both foreign nationals and military members. 98 However, the 2016 UCMJ revision amended the Article to
prohibit only the confinement of U.S. military members with enemy prisoners and other foreign nationals detained under the laws of war. 99 While this
provision may still result in legal errors, especially at overseas confinement
facilities and during times of war, the new provision will reduce the number
of errors as most Article 12 violations that occurred before the 2016 revision
involved confinement with foreign nationals. 100
But, as Article 12 claims dwindle, claims regarding unlawful confinement in civilian facilities are on the rise. Depending on the length of the sentence, military members typically serve their sentences in one of three
locations: a local confinement facility, a level II or medium-security facility,
or the maximum-security facility at Fort Leavenworth. 101 Military prisons
are typically more desirable than Federal Bureau of Prisons institutions, as
they tend to be safer, cleaner, and less crowded. 102 But, due to budgetary restrictions, the military has begun to close and consolidate military correctional facilities. 103 As a result, the military has developed an increasing need
to house prisoners in civilian institutions. 104
While servicemembers placed in civilian facilities are subject to the same
regulations and restrictions as the civilians in that institution, 105 the use of
these facilities, particularly their use for temporary confinement, creates
unique challenges for the military. 106 One of these challenges is civilian confinement facilities’ use of administrative segregation, 107 a form of solitary

97. 10 U.S.C. § 812 (2012) (amended 2016).
98. Zelnick, supra note 96, at 12.
99. 10 U.S.C. § 812 (2018).
100. Schlueter, supra note 7, at 27. The most obvious problem is the potential for temporary imprisonment with enemy prisoners. See, e .g ., United States v. Wise, 64 M.J. 468 (C.A.A.F.
2007); Robinson v. Sloop, No. 16-cv-01361, 2017 WL 679963 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017). The second problem is that the military might commit a legal error while attempting to avoid running
afoul of Article 12’s prohibitions. See United States v. Gusev, No. ACM S32392, 2018 WL
4443182, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018) (finding that a civilian confinement facility
kept defendant in administrative segregation in order to avoid violating Article 12).
101. Baker, supra note 89, at 83.
102 . Id .
103 . See id .
104 . Id .
105. 10 U.S.C. § 858.
106 . See generally Zelnick, supra note 96. For example, United States v . Gay, an important
CAAF case on confinement of military prisoners in civilian facilities, has been cited 145 times
in just four years. 75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
107 . See, e .g ., Gay, 75 M.J. at 265 (noting that the civilian correctional facility confined
Gay in administrative segregation for nine days for reasons unrelated to discipline); United
States v. Stortz, 2017 WL 1735167, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2017) (noting that a ci-
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confinement that separates a servicemember from all other prisoners and
confines him for up to twenty-three hours per day. 108 In United States v . Gay,
the Air Force CCA noted that while administrative segregation violated neither the defendant’s Eighth Amendment constitutional right nor his Article
55 statutory right against cruel and unusual punishment, the conditions rendered the sentence inappropriately severe; thus, the court awarded sentence
credit. 109 The CAAF upheld this ruling, suggesting that the facts of the case
demonstrated a legal deficiency in the posttrial process. 110 In addition to administrative segregation, a plethora of other branch-specific regulations may
result in legal error during a defendant’s stay in a civilian confinement facility, especially if that stay is temporary. 111
3.

Trial Counsel Misconduct at Sentencing

Improper argument by the trial counsel is one of the most commonly alleged legal errors. 112 While improper arguments may occur at several stages
of trial proceedings, this Note focuses on trial counsel misconduct during
sentencing, as this error was appropriately resolved through convening authority action before the 2013 reforms 113 and currently may be resolved
through sentence credit. 114 Moreover, as of 2014, accusations of trial counsel
misconduct during sentencing comprised the largest category of military appeals. 115

vilian confinement facility held a military prisoner in administrative segregation for twentyeight days due to lack of available space in the general population area).
108 . What is Administrative Segregation?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Mar. 25, 2012), https://
nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-administrative-segregation [https://perma.cc/M8LM-8YL4].
109. United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736, 742–43 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J.
264.
110 . Gay, 75 M.J. at 269.
111 . See generally SEC’Y OF THE NAVY, SECNAV M-1640.1, DEP’T OF THE NAVY
CORRECTIONS MANUAL (2019).
112. William J. Kilgallin, Prosecutorial Power, Abuse, and Misconduct, ARMY LAW., Apr.
1987, at 19, 23. Other types of prosecutorial misconduct may occur throughout court-martial
proceedings. As the CAAF stated, “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when trial counsel ‘overstep[s] the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such
an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.’ ” United States v. Hornback, 73 M.J. 155,
159 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). Examples of prosecutorial misconduct include discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of the
law, ex parte communications, failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant, and the
known use of false evidence. See generally Kilgallin, supra.
113 . See United States v. Adams, 1 M.J. 877, 879 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (suggesting that convening authority assessment of a sentence that excludes the alleged trial counsel misconduct
was the proper procedure).
114 . See United States v. Shows, 5 M.J. 892, 893 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978) (holding that reassessment of the sentence was an appropriate remedy for prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s
improper argument at sentencing); see also United States v. Ignatko, 33 M.J. 571, 574 (NM.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Barnack, 10 M.J. 799, 800 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981).
115. Baker, supra note 89, at 74.
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Trial counsel face numerous restrictions during sentencing arguments,
some universal to both the civilian and military criminal justice systems and
some unique to the military justice system. As in the civilian system, a trial
counsel may not argue that the sentencing authority should impose a sentence based on a sentence adjudged in a different case. 116 Trial counsel must
also take care when arguing for a sentence based on general deterrence. 117
Moreover, while it is permissible for both civilian prosecutors and trial counsel to draw the sentencing authority’s attention to the defendant’s lack of
remorse, it is unconstitutional to argue for a stiffer sentence based on the defendant’s failure to plead guilty or failure to testify. 118 Finally, as in the civilian system, trial counsel cannot seek to inflame the sentencing authority’s
passions or mischaracterize findings of evidence. 119
In addition to restrictions common to both the civilian and military justice systems, trial counsel also face restrictions that are unique to the military
justice system. Unlike the civilian system, the Military Rules of Evidence apply to the sentencing phase. 120 Trial counsel also may not suggest they speak
for the convening authority or a higher authority, reference such an authority’s views or policies regarding punishment, or mention any type or amount
of punishment greater than the court-martial may adjudge. 121 Additionally,
trial counsel may not characterize punitive discharges and dismissals as
simply decisions regarding the military’s retention of the defendant, and
they may not suggest that the sentencing authority draw adverse inferences
from the fact that the defendant chose to make an unsworn statement at the
sentencing hearing. 122
Thus, trial counsel not only contend with the restrictions imposed upon
civilian attorneys, but they also must comply with additional militaryspecific restrictions. Because trial counsel face more pitfalls than their civilian counterparts, there are naturally more opportunities for legal error during military sentencing than during civilian sentencing.

116. For an overview of improper sentencing arguments that can occur in the military
justice system, see Adam Oler, Fine Lines and Sharp Points — The Nuances of Proper Sentencing Argument, REPORTER, June 2005, at 6. For an overview of improper sentencing arguments
that can occur in the civilian system, see Williams v . New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
117. Oler, supra note 116, at 8.
118 . Id . at 8–9.
119 . Id . at 9–10; see also Kilgallin, supra note 112, at 23.
120. FED. R. EVID. 1101; Schlueter, supra note 7, at 68; MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II140 (Rule 1001). In some instances, the Military Rules of Evidence may be relaxed during sentencing. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-140 (Rule 1001).
121. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-144 (Rule 1001(h)).
122. Oler, supra note 116, at 7, 11.
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B. Convening Authority Remedies Before 2013
Military law seeks “to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment.” 123 To attain this goal, the military justice system before
the 2013 reforms allowed convening authorities to remedy the aforementioned legal errors by reducing defendants’ sentences. 124 Such a sentence reduction was essentially a grant of sentence credit—the same remedy a courtmartial or CCA would provide. However, convening authority discretion
and timeliness provided a more efficient and effective remedy than courtsmartial and CCAs. 125
Prior to the 2013 reforms, an appeal to the convening authority was “an
accused’s best hope for sentence relief,” 126 as convening authorities were not
bound by the strict legal rules and precedents that bind military judges. 127
Convening authorities thus had more discretion to issue sentence credit for
legal errors than either the courts-martial or the CCAs. 128 Consequently, an
accused had a significantly better chance at receiving sentence credit for legal
errors from the convening authority than from the military courts. 129
In addition to greater discretion, convening authorities could provide
sentence credit significantly faster than the CCAs. For example, in 2017, a
soldier in the Army could have received sentence credit from the convening

123. MCM 2012, supra note 18, at I-1 (3. Nature and Purpose of Military Law).
124 . See Baker, supra note 89, at 77. There are very few studies ascertaining the frequency
with which convening authorities used their Article 60 sentencing power, but Baker concludes
that the power was usually used to reduce sentences in response to legal errors. See id .
125. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 227–28.
126. United States v. Davis, 58 M.J. 100, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2003). But see generally Michael J.
Marinello, Convening Authority Clemency: Is It Really an Accused’s Best Chance of Relief?, 54
NAVAL L. REV. 169 (2007) (suggesting that the modern convening authority rarely exercises
her clemency powers).
127 . See, e .g ., United States v. Boatner, 20 C.M.A. 376, 377–78 (1971) (noting that convening authorities have much broader discretion than CCAs). The ability to grant sentence
relief without considering legal rules and precedent provides convening authorities a significant amount of discretion that they can potentially abuse. This argument is addressed infra in
Sections III.A.2 and III.B.1.
128. In United States v . Gusev, for example, the convening authority granted the defendant sentence credit for both Article 12 and Article 13 violations even though the Air Force
CCA suggested it would not have provided such credit. See generally No. ACM S32392, 2018
WL 4443182, at *2, *7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2018). The court noted that the appellant
did not exhaust his administrative remedies and that there were substantial differences between the appellant’s case and United States v . Gay. Gusev, 2018 WL 4443182, at *8 (comparing
the facts of this case with those of United States v . Gay, 75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016)). See also
United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 87, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that the “the convening authority significantly reduced” the appellant’s sentence despite the Navy-Marine CCA finding
no plain error in the trial counsel’s sentencing argument).
129 . See Boatner, 20 C.M.A. at 377 (“It is at the level of the convening authority that an
accused has his best opportunity for relief because of the former’s broad powers which are not
enjoyed by Courts of [Criminal Appeals] or even by [the CAAF].”).
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authority in an average of 158 days. 130 If she instead sought sentence credit
on appeal, the same soldier would expect to wait an average of 474 days. 131
C. Post-2016 UCMJ Reforms: Courts-Martial and CCAs as a Remedy
By curtailing the convening authority’s ability to revise sentences, the
2013 revision removed the most efficient and effective remedy for the procedural problems in the military justice system. The burden to resolve these
problems now falls on the courts-martial and the CCAs. Unfortunately,
courts-martial and CCAs are ill-equipped to resolve these problems for two
reasons. First, military courts have far less discretion to deal with common
legal errors such as pretrial punishment, posttrial confinement conditions,
and prosecutorial misconduct at sentencing, resulting in fewer remedies for
defendants. 132 Second, the length of posttrial legal action, measured by the
time from sentencing to a CCA’s verdict, prohibits many servicemembers
from seeking sentence credit on appeal. 133
1.

Pretrial Punishment

The court-martial is the first line of defense against pretrial punishment.
For pretrial confinement violations, the MCM allows the military judge to
provide “credit for each day of pretrial confinement that involves an abuse of
discretion or unusually harsh circumstances.” 134
However, the CAAF has noted that pretrial punishment “does not create
a per se right to sentencing credit.” 135 To warrant a remedy, the punishment

130. CHARLES N. PEDE, REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY:
OCTOBER 1, 2016 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2017, at 40 (2017), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov
/annual/FY17AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/99HA-3TTN].
131. In 2017, the average processing time from receipt of the trial record by the Army
CCA to the court’s decision was 316 days. Id . Taking into account the average convening authority processing time and not including the relatively minimal time it takes for the CCA to
receive the trial record, the average soldier did not receive a ruling until 474 days after her trial.
See id .
132 . See, e .g ., United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 145 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“Congress’s statutory grant of authority to the CCAs with respect to findings and sentence is more limited than
the authority granted a convening authority.”); United States v. Bischoff, 74 M.J. 664, 669 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2015).
133 . See also Jan E. Aldykiewicz, Recent Developments in Sentencing: A Sentencing Potpourri from Pretrial Agreement Terms Affecting Sentencing to Sentence Rehearings, ARMY LAW.,
July 2004, at 100, 127–31. See generally Michael G. Seidel, Giving Service Members the Credit
They Deserve: A Review of Sentencing Credit and Its Application, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1999, at 1
(discussing the many situations in which an individual might receive sentence credit).
134. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-27 (Rule 305(k)).
135. United States v. Adcock, 65 M.J. 18, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (suggesting that “confinement in violation of service regulations does not create a per se right to sentencing credit” because “not all violations of law result in individually enforceable remedies” (emphasis added)).

632

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:613

must have materially prejudiced a substantial right of the servicemember. 136
When assessing whether an Article 13 violation substantially prejudiced a
defendant, military appellate courts look to factors such as the nature of the
violation, the harm the defendant suffered, and what relief the defendant is
seeking on appeal. 137 Courts-martial and CCAs also rely heavily on whether
confinement officials intended to punish and whether the defendant failed to
complain of confinement conditions. 138
Due to the fact-specific nature of these inquiries, a remedy for pretrial
punishment—typically sentence credit—rests squarely within a courtmartial’s discretion. 139 The aforementioned barriers, however, bar many
claims. 140 Consequently, courts-martial often do not award a remedy, forcing
defendants to seek a remedy on appeal. 141
The CAAF has stated that, on appeal, the CCAs should review findings
of fact for clear error while reviewing the court-martial’s findings of law de
novo. 142 Because the facts of a case drive a court’s pretrial-punishment analysis, the standard crafted by the CAAF hamstrings defendants’ ability to receive sentence credit for pretrial punishment in the CCAs. 143 For instance, in
United States v . Mosby, the CAAF noted that the intent to punish is one of

136. 10 U.S.C. § 859, art. 59(a); United States v. Villamil-Perez, 32 M.J. 341, 342 (C.M.A.
1991) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to relief because the Article 13 violation did
not materially prejudice him).
137 . See United States v. Zarbatany, 70 M.J. 169, 176–77 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
138 . Adcock, 65 M.J. at 25 (“When a violation of Article 13, UCMJ, is alleged, we scrutinize the government’s ‘purpose or intent to punish, determined by examining the intent of detention officials or by examining the purposes served by the restriction or condition, and
whether such purposes are “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” ’ ”
(quoting United States v. King, 61 M.J. 225, 227 (2005))); United States v. McLean, 70 M.J. 573,
577 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011); United States v. Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002). See
Riley, supra note 92, at 38 for a list of decisional factors that courts use to assess whether pretrial punishment in the context of confinement has occurred.
139 . See Riley, supra note 92, at 39, 47 (“Court decisions in this area are highly dependent
upon the specific facts that define the case; specifically, whether an authority intentionally acted in a way calculated to serve as punishment or whether the authority’s conduct was consistent with an otherwise legitimate governmental purpose.”).
140 . See, e .g ., United States v. Hutchins, No. 200800393, 2018 WL 580178, at *49 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2018) (affirming a court-martial’s ruling that sentence credit should not
be provided because there existed no evidence that the military official intended to punish the
defendant). This is especially true in the case where an accused did not complain about pretrial
punishment. Seidel, supra note 133, at 13.
141 . See Seidel, supra note 133, at 13.
142 . Mosby, 56 M.J. at 310.
143. Riley, supra note 92, at 38–39; see Jeremy Stone Weber, The Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Review in Military Justice Appeals, 223 MIL. L. REV. 41, 48 (2015) (noting that under the clear error standard of review, “the appellate court will uphold any reasonable finding
of fact, ‘even though it is convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently’ ” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985))).
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the most significant factors in pretrial-punishment cases. 144 In the same
breath, the CAAF stated that intent to punish is a finding of fact and thus
subject to review for clear error. 145 Unsurprisingly, the defendant could not
demonstrate clear error, and the court found that no pretrial punishment
occurred, basing its ruling on the lack of intent to punish. 146
2.

Posttrial Confinement Conditions

Courts-martial likely lack the ability to address legal errors involving
posttrial confinement conditions. Article 39(a) governs the posttrial hearings
that the 2016 version of Article 60 explicitly authorizes. 147 Though the 2016
reforms did not substantially revise Article 39(a), 148 President Trump significantly revised Rule for Court-Martial 1104, 149 which provides substantial
procedural direction to military judges. 150 The Rule outlines the scope and
purpose of posttrial hearings and provides a nonexclusive list of posttrial
motions that a party may bring. 151
While the CAAF has yet to interpret the revised rule, Article 39(a)
posttrial sessions likely do not extend to allegations of unlawful posttrial
confinement. The stated purpose of such hearings is to resolve any posttrial
matter that “substantially affects the legal sufficiency of any findings of guilty
or the sentence.” 152 An analysis of case law 153 reveals that the CAAF has typically interpreted this language to include only errors that directly relate to a
court-martial’s proceedings, such as allegations of jury misconduct, misleading instructions, insufficient evidence, and newly discovered evidence. 154
Though allegations of unlawful posttrial confinement conditions likely
would not fall within this limited category of errors, such allegations are even
less likely to fall within Rule 1104’s new “scope” section. 155 This section restricts court-martial action to the reconsideration of “any trial ruling that

144 . Mosby, 56 M.J. at 310.
145 . Id .
146 . Id . at 310–11.
147. 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2018); id . § 860 (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
148 . See 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
149. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-164 to -165 (Rule 1104).
150 . Compare MCM 2016, supra note 68, at II-146 to -147 (Rule 1102), with MCM 2019,
supra note 10, at II-164 to -165 (Rule 1104).
151. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-164 to -165 (Rule 1104).
152 . Id . at II-165 (Rule 1104(a)(2)). This is the same language the CAAF addressed in its
previous Article 39(a) cases. See, e .g ., United States v. Scaff, 29 M.J. 60, 65 (C.M.A. 1989).
153 . See generally Randy L. Woolf, The Post-Trial Authority of the Military Judge, ARMY
LAW., Jan. 1991, at 27.
154 . E .g ., United States v. Griffith, 27 M.J. 42, 47 (C.M.A. 1988); Scaff, 29 M.J. at 66. The
CAAF, however, has historically interpreted court-martial powers under Article 39 broadly.
Tate & Holland, An Ongoing Trend: Expanding the Status and Power of the Military Judge,
ARMY LAW., Oct. 1992, at 23, 26.
155. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-165 (Rule 1104(a)(3)).
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substantially affects the legal sufficiency of any findings of guilty or the sentence.” 156 Because posttrial confinement conditions do not involve a “trial
ruling,” servicemembers are unlikely to obtain remedies in courts-martial. 157
By eliminating the convening authority’s ability to provide relief for
posttrial confinement issues and by failing to grant courts-martial the ability
to hear such arguments, the 2013 and 2016 amendments left potential remedies to the CCAs. Such appeals, however, are largely inadequate for two reasons. First, in order to obtain appellate relief for posttrial confinement conconditions, an appellant must convince the court to exercise its Article 66
power to revise sentences. 158 While the Article 66 power is discretionary, 159
the CAAF has admonished the CCAs not to use this power to “grant sentence appropriateness relief for any conditions of post-trial confinement of
which they disapprove.” 160 Instead, the posttrial confinement conditions
must constitute a legal error. 161 As a result, CCAs have been hesitant to exercise their Article 66 power to resolve posttrial confinement issues. 162 For instance, in United States v . Burrell, the Air Force CCA—the court that issued
United States v . Gay 163—declined to extend its precedent in Gay to a remarkably similar fact pattern. 164 A similar trend is present in other CCAs. 165

156 . Id . (emphasis added).
157 . See id .
158. UCMJ Article 66(d) allows military appellate courts to “affirm only . . . the sentence
or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” 10 U.S.C. § 866(d).
159. United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
160 . Id . at 269; see also United States v. Ferrando, 77 M.J. 506, 517 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2017) (“[W]e are not a clearing house for post-trial confinement complaints or grievances.”).
161 . Gay, 75 M.J. at 268.
162. Baker, supra note 89, at 73.
163. United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736, 742–43 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J.
264; see supra Section II.A.2.
164. United States v. Burrell, No. ACM S32523, 2019 WL 4412256, at *5–6 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2019).
165. Precedent has primarily stemmed from the Air Force CCA. A brief survey of case
law reveals that the Air Force CCA has attempted to limit Gay. See, e .g ., id . (refusing to extend
Gay to a similar fact pattern); United States v. Buford, 77 M.J. 562, 564 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2017) (refusing to extend Gay to lack of payment for accrued leave); United States v. Anderson,
No. ACM 39141, 2018 WL 1176456, at *5–6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2018) (affirming
Buford and refusing to extend Gay to issues with posttrial delay). The Army CCA has only
considered Gay’s holding on the Article 66 power in four instances, refusing to exercise the
Article 66 power in each case. See United States v. Cannon, ARMY 20180034, 2020 WL
1146669 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2020); United States v. Czaiczynski, ARMY 20170309, 2019
WL 993094 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2019); United States v. Bowhall, ARMY 20170357, 2019
WL 718971 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2019); United States v. Jessie, ARMY 20160187, 2018
WL 6892945 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2018). The Navy-Marine CCA has only considered
Gay once, also refusing to exercise its Article 66 power. United States v. Wagers, No.
201600180, 2017 WL 712784 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2017). The Coast Guard CCA has
yet to consider Gay.
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Second, the CAAF and the CCAs have raised additional hurdles that an
appellant must clear before a court will exercise its powers in response to
posttrial confinement issues. For instance, courts have demanded that an
appellant first seek administrative remedies and demonstrate that the conditions of confinement rendered the sentence inappropriately severe. 166 Consequently, defendants are often unable to obtain a remedy via appellate rereview of posttrial confinement conditions. 167
3.

Trial Counsel Misconduct at Sentencing

A military judge may provide a remedy for trial counsel misconduct
during sentencing—typically a member panel instruction—upon timely objection by defense counsel or sua sponte. 168 Moreover, if a military judge believes that misconduct influenced the sentence delivered by a member panel,
she can, sua sponte or at the request of the defense counsel, recommend that
the convening authority suspend a portion of the sentence. 169 But this remedy is ineffective if the military judge delivers the sentence. Because a judge
should not take improper sentencing arguments into consideration, 170 she is
unlikely to alter a sentence she handed down on the grounds that she was
influenced by an improper sentencing argument. As the 2016 reforms favor
sentencing by a military judge as opposed to a member panel, a servicemember is less likely to receive a court-martial remedy for such misconduct than
he was before the 2016 reforms. 171
If a court-martial does not provide a remedy for trial counsel misconduct during sentencing, the burden falls on the CCA. Unlike a convening authority, a CCA will not act unless the trial counsel’s offense meets the legal
definition of trial counsel misconduct and prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights. 172 Moreover, except in extreme circumstances, the defense
must have preserved the appeal in the court-martial via an objection. 173 The
166 . See, e .g ., Jessie, 2018 WL 6892945, at *2 (noting that, though the issue was not
briefed, the court would assume, for sake of argument, that the defendant had exhausted all
administrative remedies available); Wagers, 2017 WL 712784, at *6 (noting that a “prisoner
must seek administrative relief prior to invoking judicial intervention”). But see United States
v. Henry, 76 M.J. 595, 610 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (declining to require that the defendant
exhaust all administrative remedies but noting that the court will give “significant weight” to a
defendant’s failure to exhaust such remedies).
167. Baker, supra note 89, at 83–84.
168 . See Oler, supra note 116, at 10–12.
169 . See United States v. Shows, 5 M.J. 892, 893 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978). This recommendation must include “(A) the portion(s) of the sentence to which the recommendation applies;
(B) the minimum duration of the suspension; and (C) the facts supporting the suspension recommendation.” MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-160 (Rule 1101(a)(5)).
170 . See United States v. Montgomery, 20 C.M.A. 35, 39 (1970).
171 . See Schlueter, supra note 7, at 141.
172 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 87, 88–89 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
173. Failure to object to improper arguments during sentencing “shall constitute forfeiture of the objection.” MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-144 (Rule 1001(h)); see also United
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increased use of military judges in sentencing will also complicate appeals.
Unlike member panels, judges are presumed to have ignored improper arguments. 174 This presumption will make it substantially more difficult for
servicemembers who faced trial counsel misconduct during sentencing to
receive relief on appeal.
4.

Length of Posttrial Legal Action

The length of posttrial legal action also prohibits servicemembers from
seeking sentence credit on appeal. In 2018, the average time of posttrial legal
action in the Army, not including delays in receipt of trial records by the
Army CCA, was 438 days—136 days of processing and 302 days of appellate
action. 175 This length of time prohibits a soldier who is serving a sentence
less than 438 days from receiving sentence credit because she will have completed her sentence before receiving a ruling. 176 Therefore, many servicemembers are deterred from seeking the remedy at all.
The implementation of the 2016 reforms will likely fail to reduce the average length of posttrial legal action. Though the 2013 reforms’ elimination
of the convening authority’s posttrial sentence-revision powers may have resulted in decreased posttrial processing times, it likely has forced more defendants to seek remedies in the CCAs. 177 In fact, the Navy Judge Advocate
General’s 2017 report noted that the percentage of cases appealed has increased from 22 percent in 2009 to 36 percent in 2017. 178
Thus far, the increase in the percentage of cases appealed has not translated into increased appellate delays, 179 as it may have been offset by a de-

States v. Kropf, 39 M.J. 107, 110 (C.M.A. 1994) (“[D]efense counsel should be ever vigilant to
object and seek a curative instruction where appropriate. The failure to object constitutes waiver in the absence of plain error.”).
174 . See United States v. Nellum, 21 M.J. 700, 702 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of
some showing that the judge was influenced by an improper argument, he must be presumed
to have ignored it.”).
175. CHARLES N. PEDE, U.S. ARMY REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
(2018), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/Article%20146a%20Reports%20-%20FY
18%20-%20All%20Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BN-UK9Z].
176 . See Schlueter, supra note 6, at 228. This scenario also does not factor in posttrial
confinement-reducing scenarios such as the application of pretrial-confinement time to the
sentence. For example, an individual might receive an eighteen-month sentence but receive
one hundred days of pretrial sentence credit. This would reduce the individual’s posttrial confinement from approximately 450 days to 350 days.
177. Brent A. Goodwin, Congress Offends Eisenhower and Cicero by Annihilating Article
60, UCMJ, ARMY LAW., July 2014, at 23, 31.
178 . ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY: OCTOBER 1,
2016 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2017, at 57 (2017), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY17
AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/99HA-3TTN]
179 . See, e .g ., U.S. MARINE CORPS ANNUAL MILITARY JUSTICE REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017, at 98 fig.C (2017), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY17AnnualReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99HA-3TTN]
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crease in the total number of cases docketed. 180 The decrease stems from the
decline in total courts-martial, which is likely due to the military’s increasing
reliance on administrative remedies to resolve disciplinary issues. 181 As long
as this trend holds, appellate delays should remain stagnant; however, if the
trend toward administrative remedies reverses, appellants should expect increased delays. Thus, at best, the length of posttrial legal action will remain
prohibitively long for many servicemembers.
III. A NEW EXCEPTION TO UCMJ ARTICLE 60A
The convening authority was the most efficient and effective remedy for
legal errors that occurred during the military justice process. 182 Unfortunately, while the 2013 and 2016 reforms improved the handling of sexual assault
charges in the military justice system, they exacerbated other issues by limiting the convening authority’s remedial powers. This Part proposes that Congress add an additional subsection to Article 60a (UCMJ Section 860a) that
allows convening authorities to reduce sentences based on the legal errors
that frequently occur during the military justice process. The proposed reform would reinstitute the most efficient and effective remedy for legal errors while serving the goal of the 2013 reforms: restraining convening
authority discretion.
The following Sections outline the proposed reform, discussing how it
not only remedies legal errors but also restrains convening authority discretion. This Part then addresses several counterarguments, namely that the
proposed revision (1) would provide convening authorities too much discre-

180 . See, e .g ., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
NAVY’S UNIFORMED LEGAL COMMUNITIES 87 fig.12 (2019), https://media.defense.gov
/2020/May/18/2002301989/-1/-1/1/COMPREHENSIVE%20REVIEW%20DON%20UNIFOR
MED%20LEGAL%20COMMUNITIES.PDF [https://perma.cc/3G5K-GNB7].
181. Fredric I. Lederer, From Rome to the Military Justice Acts of 2016 and Beyond: Continuing Civilianization of the Military Criminal Legal System, 225 MIL. L. REV. 512, 532 (2017);
see also Baker, supra note 89, at 81. The amount of cases reviewed by CCAs has decreased as
the use of courts-martial has decreased. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 180, at 81, 87. For instance, the Navy-Marine CCA docketed 2,003 cases in 2005, whereas it only docketed 348 in
2015 (roughly an 83 percent decrease). Id . at 87. This decrease roughly corresponds to a decrease in general and special courts-martial. In fiscal year 2004, between the Navy and the Marines, 2,185 general courts-martial and bad conduct-discharge special courts-martial went to
trial compared to just 692 in fiscal year 2014 (approximately a 68 percent decrease). MICHAEL
F. LOHR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY: OCTOBER 1, 2003
TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 app. (2004), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY04Annual
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA7F-RY6N]; U.S. MARINE CORPS ANNUAL MILITARY JUSTICE
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 app. at 109 (2014), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual
/FY14AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9B2-U5PE].
Professor Lederer attributes this decrease to the increasing use of administrative remedies,
such as Administrative Separation Boards, to resolve disciplinary issues. Lederer, supra, at 532;
see also DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 180, at 81–82.
182 . See supra Section II.B.
THE
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tion, (2) is unnecessary because alternative paths to relief already exist, and
(3) does not provide convening authorities sufficient discretion.
A. Restoring the Most Efficient and Effective Remedy for Legal Errors
Article 60a and 60b regulate convening authorities’ ability to act on
court-martial sentences. 183 Article 60a, the focus of this Note, bars convening
authorities from acting on sentences that include (1) a punitive discharge or
dismissal, (2) a total period of confinement for all offenses involved, running
consecutively, that is greater than six months, or (3) the death penalty. 184 It
also provides two exceptions to this rule. 185 First, if the military judge recommends that the convening authority suspend part of a sentence, then the
convening authority may act on that recommendation. 186 Second, the convening authority may act on a sentence if the trial counsel recommends that
the convening authority reduce, commute, or suspend a sentence based on
the accused’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another individual. 187
This Note proposes the addition of a third exception that would allow
the convening authority to alter sentences of confinement based on legal errors that occurred during the military justice process. The language of the
proposed exception would state:
(e) REDUCTION OF SENTENCE FOR LEGAL ERRORS:
(1) Upon the written review and recommendation of a staff judge advocate or legal advisor, if the convening authority finds that a legal error
occurred before trial, during trial, or within 60 days of sentencing, the convening authority may reduce a sentence of confinement by up to 56 days.
(2) Upon the written review and recommendation of a staff judge advocate or legal advisor, if the convening authority finds that a legal error
occurred before trial, during trial, or within 60 days of sentencing, the convening authority may reduce a sentence of confinement by more than 56
days subject to the review and approval by the Office of the Judge Advocate
General of the branch concerned.
(3) The convening authority must act within 90 days of receiving a
submission by the accused under subsection (f) that alleges legal error. 188

Paragraph (1) would allow the convening authority to reduce a sentence of
confinement up to fifty-six days if she found that a legal error occurred be-

183. 10 U.S.C. §§ 860a–860b. For a detailed analysis of section 860a, see supra Section
I.C.
184. 10 U.S.C. § 860a(b)(1).
185 . Id . § 860a(c)–(d).
186 . Id . § 860a(c).
187 . Id . § 860a(d).
188. This proposal was modeled after the two existing statutory exceptions to Article 60a.
See id . § 860a(c)–(d).
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tween the time a crime is reported and sixty days after sentencing. Paragraph
(2) provides the convening authority discretion to reduce a sentence beyond
fifty-six days, but it subjects such a reduction to review by the Office of the
Judge Advocate General of the relevant military branch. Paragraph (3) requires the convening authority to act on the allegation of error within ninety
days of receiving the accused’s submission.
1.

An Efficient and Effective Remedy

The revision’s breadth of coverage combined with the scope of convening authority discretion and the timeliness of convening authority review
creates an efficient and effective remedy for legal errors that occur throughout the military justice process.
The proposed reform provides the convening authority discretion to
target all legal errors that may occur from the time a crime is reported to up
to sixty days after sentencing. Such breadth supports efficient and effective
remedies for two reasons. First, the proposal approximately covers the portion of the military justice system that convening authorities already oversee.
The UCMJ demands that convening authorities take an active role in the
military justice system, supervising the actions of subordinates involved in
the process. 189 The UCMJ also charges convening authorities with the review
of allegations of legal error submitted by the accused after trial. 190 Thus, the
proposed reform simply restores the role convening authorities and their
staff judge advocates have occupied since the UCMJ’s inception. Even review
by the Offices of the Judge Advocate General in the narrow circumstances
outlined in paragraph (2) of the proposed reform keeps the institutions in
their traditional roles as the Offices of the Judge Advocate General already
review some cases under Article 69. 191 This reform might be contrasted with
reforms that add bureaucracy to an already bureaucratic system. 192 Ultimately, the proposed reform permits swift handling of accusations of legal error. 193
Second, the proposed breadth allows convening authorities to address a
wider range of issues than courts-martial. Convening authorities are uniquely situated in the court-martial process. Unlike courts-martial, convening authority review under the proposed reform would take place after the courtmartial and sentencing, allowing convening authorities to assess errors made

189 . See supra Section I.A.
190 . See MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-166 to -167 (Rule 1106). This review, however,
is obviously meaningless if the convening authority is forbidden from acting on the sentence
under UCMJ section 860a.
191. 10 U.S.C. § 869.
192 . See, e .g ., Simms, supra note 43, at 327–30.
193 . See Schlueter, supra note 6, at 228.
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before, during, and after the court-martial. 194 Furthermore, because convening authorities are not intimately involved in the trial, they can provide an
objective assessment of alleged legal errors that occurred during the trial. 195
Thus, the breadth of the proposed reform provides more effective remedies
than courts-martial can provide. 196
While some might object that a convening authority’s bias may taint a
posttrial review, such a critique is flawed. A convening authority and the defendant are usually separated by several layers of the military hierarchy, so
the convening authority will often have little to no relationship with the defendant. 197 Additionally, convening authorities and their staff judge advocates recognize the need to promote evenhanded justice. 198 And, even in the
unlikely case that the convening authority was biased in favor of the defendant, the proposed reform provides many checks on her discretion. 199
In terms of the scope of convening authority power, the proposed reform cautiously restores discretion that the 2013 reforms removed. Such expanded discretion provides efficient and effective remedies for three reasons.
First, discretion to act on all sentences allows every defendant, regardless of
punishment, to seek redress of legal errors with the convening authority. The
current rules bar any defendant whose sentence includes a dismissal, punitive discharge, or more than six months’ confinement from obtaining relief
from the convening authority. 200 There are few, if any, other contexts in
criminal law where a defendant’s procedural protections decrease as the severity of his sentence increases. 201 On the contrary, the more severe a sentence, the more likely the civilian criminal justice system is to provide
additional procedure. 202 The new provision eliminates the current unreasonable distinction between those who receive greater punishment and those
194 . See supra Section I.A. As noted, courts-martial are unlikely to review alleged legal
errors that occur after the trial concludes. See supra Section II.C.2. The proposed reform, in
contrast, expressly allows convening authorities to address posttrial errors.
195. In this position, convening authorities perform a similar function as appellate
courts. They serve as a fresh pair of eyes that provide detached evaluation of the trial. See
DAVID W. NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS, AND
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 375 (7th ed. 2017) (discussing the role of appellate courts).
196. With respect to the above arguments, the CCAs are similar to convening authorities
in many ways. The one advantage a convening authority has in this respect is her ability to
conduct a more thorough review of a defendant’s allegations of legal error. See infra Section
III.A.1.
197 . See Simms, supra note 43, at 306.
198 . See infra Section III.B.3.
199 . See infra Section III.A.2.
200. 10 U.S.C. § 860a(b)(1)(A)–(C).
201. An exception to this general rule might be the Federal Rules of Evidence’s treatment
of prior instances of sexual assault or child molestation in criminal sexual assault or childmolestation cases. See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
202 . See, e .g ., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (dividing the right to an attorney under the Sixth Amendment between crimes that ultimately impose imprisonment and
those that do not).
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who receive lesser punishment, allowing all defendants to seek relief from
the convening authority.
Second, increased discretion allows defendants to receive timely relief.
Convening authority action is significantly faster than relief provided by the
military appellate process, allowing defendants who receive shorter sentences to obtain effective relief. 203 An individual who receives a remedy under
paragraph (1) of the proposed reform will, in the most extreme case, receive
the remedy within 180 days. 204 Swift relief translates into effective relief, as
sentence credit is only an effective remedy if it is provided before the accused
completes his sentence. 205 With the exception of outlier cases that are unlikely to occur, the proposed reform guarantees that a remedy received will be
effective for defendants with posttrial sentences—the total sentence less any
pretrial confinement time served—as short as six months. 206
While one might argue that the increase in appeals to convening authorities may lengthen posttrial processing times, such concerns are likely unfounded. The effect of the 2013 revision, which largely eliminated convening
authority review, on posttrial processing times appears to be mixed. For instance, between 2017 and 2018, the Army reduced its posttrial processing
times from an average of 158 days to an average of 136 days. 207 However,
posttrial processing times in the Marine Corps appear to have remained relatively steady since 2010. 208 The proposed review is also more limited in scope
than the review conducted by convening authorities before the 2013 reforms,
focusing solely on whether legal error occurred instead of broad questions of
clemency. 209 Finally, even if the proposed reform slightly increases posttrial

203 . See supra Section II.C.4.
204. Under paragraphs (1) and (2) of the proposed provision, a defendant may only
submit allegations of legal error that occurred within sixty days of sentencing. The MCM
would add a provision to Rule 1106 that requires the accused to submit such allegations within
ten days of the alleged posttrial error, with the possibility of a twenty-day extension for good
cause. See MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-166 (Rule 1106(d)(4)(A)). Section three then requires the convening authority to act on the allegation within ninety days of the accused’s
submission. This equates to 180 days.
205. While expedited procedures may lead to effective relief in that an accused may receive sentence credit before his sentence expires, such procedures could lead to the provision
of undeserved relief absent proper procedural protections. For a discussion on the proposed
reform’s procedural safeguards, see infra Section III.A.2.
206. For instance, if an error occurs before trial, the defendant must submit this allegation to the convening authority within ten days after his sentence is announced. See MCM
2019, supra note 10, at II-166 (Rule 1106). The convening authority then has ninety days to
investigate the allegation and decide whether to act on the sentence. See supra text accompanying note 188. In total, the process takes one hundred days. If the defendant received the maximum credit allowed under paragraph (1), this credit would be effective for any six-month
sentence. Compare this to sentence credit provided by the average Army CCA case, which is
only effective if the defendant’s posttrial sentence is longer than 438 days. Supra Section II.C.4.
207. PEDE, supra note 130, at 40; PEDE, supra note 175, at 1.
208. PEDE, supra note 130, at 98 fig.c.
209 . See MCM 2012, supra note 18, at II-149 to -151 (Rule 1106).
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processing times, the resulting decrease in appellate times would be an offsetting benefit. 210
Lastly, increased discretion allows defendants to receive relief in a
broader array of circumstances. Because of her role as a commanding officer,
a convening authority may order an investigation into unlawful conduct that
occurred before, during, or after trial. 211 She may also review submissions
from both the accused and the crime victim, and she is not bound by the
Military Rules of Evidence. 212 Armed with discretion and information to
which neither the court-martial nor the CCA has access, a convening authority may determine that a defendant with a borderline claim to sentence
credit deserves relief. 213 Consequently, the reform restores “an accused’s best
hope for sentence relief.” 214
2.

Checks on Convening Authority Discretion

The proposed reform also provides several checks on convening authorities’ power to reduce sentences for legal error. These checks include review and written recommendation by a staff judge advocate, Article 60a’s
requirement of a written explanation, the sixty-day limitation on posttrial
legal errors, and the fifty-six-day sentence-credit limit.
The requirement of review and written recommendation by a staff judge
advocate will circumscribe convening authority action. When determining
whether to act on a sentence, the UCMJ demands that convening authorities
consult with their staff judge advocates. 215 The reform adds to this provision,
requiring not only a consultation but a review and written recommendation
by the staff judge advocate before a convening authority may reduce a sentence based on legal error. 216 Such a requirement partially restores the pre2016 revision requirement that a staff judge advocate provide a recommendation before a convening authority acts on the findings or sentence of a

210 . See supra Section II.C.4.
211. The MCM has long recognized a convening authority’s ability to effectively and efficiently conduct investigations, entrusting her and her subordinates with the power to conduct
criminal investigations at the outset of the military justice process. See MCM 2019, supra note
10, at II-21 (Rule 303); see also JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL UNITED STATES, at II-20 (1994) (Rule 303) (recognizing convening authority’s power
to conduct investigations more than twenty-five years ago).
212. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-166 to -168 (Rules 1106, 1106A).
213. For instance, unlike a court-martial or CCA, if a convening authority finds a legal
error, she does not have to find that the error “materially prejudice[d] the substantial rights of
the accused” before providing a remedy. 10 U.S.C. § 859(a). See infra Section III.B.1 for a discussion on convening authority power and borderline cases. For an argument as to why this
discretion is proper, see infra Section III.A.2, discussing the checks the proposed reform places
on convening authority action, and Section III.B.1, arguing that it is proper for the convening
authority to have more discretion than the courts.
214. United States v. Davis, 58 M.J. 100, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
215 . See 10 U.S.C. § 806(b).
216 . See supra text accompanying note 188.
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court-martial. 217 Just as they did before the 2016 reforms, staff judge advocates will review the allegations of legal error, apply any applicable rules and
precedent, and then supply their written opinion as to what action, if any,
should be taken. 218 Unlike the pre-2016 requirement, however, the proposed
revision confines the review to allegations of legal error. 219 Consequently, the
imposition of staff judge-advocate review for legal errors will focus convening authorities’ attention on the legal issues, thereby confining convening
authority actions. 220
The UCMJ’s requirement that convening authorities submit a written
explanation when they take action on a sentence—a requirement instituted
by the 2013 reforms—also provides a significant check on convening authority power. 221 This requirement forces the convening authority to articulate
the reasons for a sentence reduction. Thus, the convening authority’s superior officers as well as the public can scrutinize the basis behind her decision. 222 This requirement also incentivizes convening authorities to respect
the recommendation of their staff judge advocates. If a convening authority
decides to act against a staff judge-advocate recommendation that she take
no action, the written-explanation requirement forces the convening authority to provide a reason not only as to why she reduced the sentence but also
as to why she opposed her staff judge advocate’s recommendation. Consequently, the written requirement will encourage convening authorities to follow their staff judge advocates’ advice, which in turn will lead to legally
defensible actions. 223
Additionally, the sixty-day restriction on posttrial errors establishes a
bright line as to when a convening authority’s jurisdiction over posttrial errors ends and where a CCA’s sole jurisdiction begins. While it is desirable

217. MCM 2012, supra note 18, at II-149 to -151 (Rule 1106(a)).
218 . Id . In United States v . Bradford, for example, defense counsel alleged improper sentencing argument. No. ACM S32288, 2016 WL 3681768, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 7,
2016). Upon review, the staff judge advocate suggested that no improper argument occurred
and suggested that the convening authority approve the sentence. Id . at *3.
219 . See supra text accompanying note 188.
220 . See United States v. Boatner, 20 C.M.A. 376, 378 (1971) (“The better the convening
authority is informed the more fairly and justly will he exercise his discretion.” (citing United
States v. Foti, 12 C.M.A. 303, 304 (1961))).
221. 10 U.S.C. § 860a(f)(2). This requirement was established by the 2013 reforms. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, sec. 1702,
§ 860(c)(2)(C), 127 Stat. 672, 955–56 (2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C.).
222. Under MCM Rules 1109(g) and 1110(e), the staff judge advocate forwards the written explanation to the court-martial. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at II-175 to -176. The UCMJ
then demands that the president make the court-martial documents available to the public. 10
U.S.C. § 860c(a).
223. Recall that Lieutenant General Franklin was under no obligation to justify his actions in the Wilkerson case. Memo Gives Insight, supra note 28. He produced a written justification after his actions came under intense public scrutiny. Still, his written explanation allowed
his superiors and the public to scrutinize his reasoning. Id .
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for convening authorities to oversee a defendant’s transition into confinement—a time when unlawful posttrial confinement is most likely to occur 224—it is undesirable for this oversight to extend well beyond that
transition. 225 Thus, convening authorities cannot become roving commissions that supervise confinement conditions.
The fifty-six-day sentence-credit limit imposes another restraint on convening authority power. First, the limit allows a convening authority to address most legal errors while restricting her ability to commute a sentence
arbitrarily or unjustifiably. Most violations of a defendant’s rights necessitate
less than fifty-six days of sentence credit. 226 In the rare case that a defendant
received a six-month sentence 227 and the convening authority granted the
maximum amount of sentence credit, a prisoner still must serve over twothirds of his confinement time. 228 This proportion only increases with more
severe sentences.
Additionally, while the proposed revision provides flexibility, it also
provides oversight. In the event of an extreme situation, the convening authority may reduce a sentence beyond the fifty-six-day limit. But the proposed revision necessitates that the Office of the Judge Advocate General of
the relevant military branch approve such a reduction. Review by the Office
of the Judge Advocate General incentivizes convening authorities to reduce a
sentence beyond the fifty-six-day limit only in cases that have strong legal
justifications, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General concerned could
overturn any reductions it finds arbitrary or unjustified.

224. The military sometimes holds defendants in temporary confinement while awaiting
transition to the military confinement facility where the defendant will serve the remainder of
his sentence. Cf . Baker, supra note 89, at 83. It is in such temporary confinement that arguable
legal errors often occur. See supra Section II.A.2.
225. Simply put, military justice is just one of a plethora of a commander’s concerns. As
Major Elizabeth Murphy wrote, “[C]ommanders must focus on the physical, material, mental,
and spiritual state of their servicemembers, civilian employees, and their families. . . . This huge
undertaking of responsibility is inherent and fundamental to serving as a commander.” Elizabeth Murphy, The Military Justice Divide: Why Only Crimes and Lawyers Belong in the CourtMartial Process, 220 MIL. L. REV. 129, 137 (2014). The more time a commander must devote to
military justice, the less time she has for her primary role. Therefore, the convening authority
should be involved no longer than is necessary to ensure the defendant’s smooth transition
into permanent confinement.
226 . See generally CRIM. L. DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S.
ARMY, CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK: PRACTICING MILITARY JUSTICE (2019) (providing an analysis of all types of sentence credit and the case law that governs such credit).
227. Recall that the proposed revision only applies to sentences that include a punitive
discharge or dismissal, six months confinement, or both. See supra Section III.A. This reform
does not address capital cases, as defendants facing the death penalty receive more protections
than the average defendant. See Schlueter, supra note 7, at 38, 64, 80, 90–92.
228. Fifty-six days constitutes about 31 percent of a six-month sentence of confinement.
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B. Responses to Counterarguments
Several critiques might be leveled at this proposed reform, including (1)
the reform provides too much discretion to convening authorities, undermining the goals of the 2013 and 2016 reforms; (2) the reform is unnecessary, as there exist alternative avenues to resolve legal errors; and (3) the
reform provides too little discretion to convening authorities. The following
explains each critique and provides a defense of the proposed reform.
1.

Too Much Convening Authority Discretion

As discussed in Part I, convening authority discretion spurred the original calls for UCMJ reform. 229 In response, the 2014 NDAA severely curtailed
convening authorities’ ability to overturn verdicts and reduce sentences. 230
The proposed reform returns a narrow portion of this revoked discretion:
the ability to reduce sentences based on legal errors.
One might object that convening authorities should not hold more discretion than courts to reduce sentences. 231 Convening authorities’ power to
reduce sentences, those who object may argue, gives servicemembers a better
chance at a sentence reduction than their civilian counterparts for seemingly
no good reason. The discrepancy is especially stark when one considers the
gradual injection into court-martial procedures of due process protections
that mirror civilian criminal justice procedures, a process known as “civilianization.” 232
The response to such a critique is twofold. First, while there has been
significant “civilianization” of the court-martial process, a large gulf between
the civilian and military criminal justice systems remains. 233 Simply put,
there exist more opportunities for the rights of a military defendant to be violated as compared to a civilian defendant. 234 For instance, while military de-

229 . See supra Section I.B.3.
230 . See supra Section I.C.
231. As noted, convening authorities may award sentence credit where courts-martial
and CCAs would refuse to provide such relief. See supra Section II.B, III.A.1.
232 . See generally Lederer, supra note 181 (discussing the gradual civilianization of the
court-martial); see also Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV.
3 (1970).
233. Dan Maurer, Are Military Courts Really Just Like Civilian Criminal Courts?,
LAWFARE (July 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-military-courts-reallyjust-civilian-criminal-courts [https://perma.cc/YQ4D-USGM].
234. For example, compare the opportunities to inflict pretrial punishment in the military justice system, see supra Section II.A.1, with the opportunities to inflict such punishment
in the civilian system, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); contrast the multiplicity of regulations that civilian confinement facilities must comply with when housing military
prisoners (military regulations as well as the facility’s regulations) with those they must comply
with when housing civilian prisoners (just the facility’s regulations), supra Section II.A.2; and
note the increased burdens on trial counsel during sentencing arguments as juxtaposed with
civilian prosecutors, see supra Section II.A.3.
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fendants face the same types of trial counsel misconduct at sentencing that
civilians face, they also face military-specific misconduct during this phase
that civilians do not. 235 Moreover, while some military-specific issues might
not rise to a constitutional violation or legal deficiency, there are situations
in which a remedy is necessary. Consider United States v . Gusev, where a civilian facility violated the defendant’s Article 12 rights by confining him with
foreign nationals. 236 The Air Force CCA noted that the defendant did not
exhaust his administrative remedies and opined that he was likely not entitled to sentence credit for the Article 12 violation. 237 In such a situation, it
would still be appropriate for a convening authority to provide a limited
remedy that at least acknowledges the wrong that the defendant suffered. In
fact, in Gusev, the convening authority ultimately provided the defendant
sentence credit for the Article 12 violation. 238 The provision of this remedy
would not be possible under the current law. 239
Second, the proposed reform focuses convening authorities’ attention on
the case’s legal merits. 240 Before the 2013 reforms, a convening authority
could provide a remedy without regard to law or precedent, and she did not
have to explain her decision. 241 The proposed revision, however, more directly links convening authority decisions to legal errors and incentivizes
convening authorities to adhere closely to the law while allowing them to exercise limited equitable judgement. 242 For example, a staff judge advocate’s
written recommendation would note if it would be a close call as to whether
the alleged conduct constituted a legal error or substantially prejudiced the
accused’s rights. The convening authority may, based on her investigation
and experience in the military, recognize that a remedy should nonetheless
be provided. 243 The written requirement then forces her to articulate her reasoning in a document that may be viewed by both her superior officers and
the public. 244 If a convening authority’s reasoning is inadequate, her superior
officers might remove her from command or deny her a promotion. 245 Thus,
under the proposed revision, convening authorities and CCAs will likely differ only when the legal questions are close calls.

235 . See supra Section II.A.3.
236. United States v. Gusev, No. ACM S32392, 2018 WL 4443182, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Aug. 21, 2018).
237 . Id . at *7.
238 . Id .
239 . See 10 U.S.C. § 860a. The defendant in Gusev was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, eleven months’ confinement, and reduction to E-1. Gusev, 2018 WL 4443182, at *1.
240 . See supra Section III.A.2.
241 . See supra Section I.A.
242 . See supra Section III.A.
243 . See Schlueter, supra note 6, at 207–08 (noting the various factors that the convening
authority and her staff judge advocate consider when making decisions on criminal matters).
244 . See supra Section III.A.2.
245. Schlueter, supra note 6, at 208.
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Other Avenues for Relief

A second criticism of the proposed reform is that it is unnecessary because UCMJ Articles 66 and 69 provide sufficient avenues for relief. Article
66 concerns review by the CCAs. 246 Weaknesses of Article 66, discussed in
Section II.C, include substantial appellate delays as well as the CCAs’ inflexibility when providing remedies. 247 The proposed reform, on the other hand,
provides both timely and effective review. 248
Article 69 concerns cases in which the defendant either does not have
direct appeal to a CCA or has waived his right to appeal. 249 If a servicemember qualifies for Article 69 review, 250 the Office of the Judge Advocate General will review his case. 251 The use of Article 69 review for cases where both
the convening authority cannot review the sentence and the defendant does
not receive automatic appeal are rare. 252 The UCMJ provides automatic appeal for sentences that include death, a dismissal or punitive discharge, or
more than two years of confinement. 253 But most guilty verdicts resulting in
a sentence of confinement for less than two years (which do not receive automatic appeal) but more than six months (which are unreviewable by the
convening authority) contain a dismissal or punitive discharge. 254 As a result, most defendants facing a sentence upon which a convening authority
currently cannot act will receive an automatic appeal to a CCA because their
sentences contain a dismissal or punitive discharge, rendering Article 69 useless.

246. 10 U.S.C. § 866; see generally supra Part II.
247. See supra Section II.C.
248. See supra Section III.A.1.
249. 10 U.S.C. § 869.
250. These qualifications are outlined in UCMJ Article 65. Id. § 865.
251. Id. § 869; PEDE, supra note 175, at 1.
252. Based on the numbers from the Navy and Marine Corps, only thirty-eight of 517
general courts-martial and bad conduct-discharge special courts-martial convictions were reviewed under Article 69(a) in 2018. JOHN G. HANNINK, NAVY REPORT ON THE STATE OF
MILITARY
JUSTICE
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2018
app.
at
19
(2018),
https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/Article%20146a%20Reports%20-%20FY18%20%20All%20Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BN-UK9Z]; D. J. LECCE, MARINE CORPS REPORT
ON THE STATE OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 app. at 9 (2018)
https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/Article%20146a%20Reports%20-%20FY18%20%20All%20Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BN-UK9Z]; 10 U.S.C. § 869(a) (2012) (amended
2016); Tyler J. Sena, Finding Avenues for Meaningful Clemency, REPORTER, no. 4, 2016, at 15,
21; JEFFREY A. ROCKWELL, AIR FORCE REPORT ON THE STATE OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2018 app. at 17 (2018), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/Article%20146a
%20Reports%20-%20FY18%20-%20All%20Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BN-UK9Z].
253. 10 U.S.C. § 866.
254. See id.; Military Discharge in the United States, VETVERIFY, https://www.vetverify
.org/javax.faces.resource/images/VOSB-Military-Discharge-Overview.pdf.xhtml?ln=default
[https://perma.cc/P6XM-8UFT].
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Attempts to obtain the benefits of this provision by waiving one’s right
to appeal are futile. If a servicemember opts into Article 69 by waiving an
appeal, the Office of the Judge Advocate General may not review allegations
of legal error. 255 Thus, servicemembers who desire review of their case and
whose sentences qualify for automatic review by a CCA must enter the appellate system. 256
The proposed reform, on the other hand, provides convening authority
review regardless of whether the UCMJ entitles the defendant to CCA review. In cases that produce the most severe punishments (cases that receive
automatic appeal to the CCAs), the proposed reform provides a second layer
of review. Moreover, unlike Article 69, the proposed reform allows the convening authority to review for legal error regardless of whether the defendant
waived his right to appeal. Therefore, a defendant will receive a review even
if he does not want to traverse the arduous military appellate process.
3.

Too Little Convening Authority Discretion

Some scholars have called for the wholesale restoration of convening authority discretion. 257 As the proposed reform only returns a limited portion
of this discretion, they might argue that the reform does not go far enough.
This critique has two underlying premises. The first premise is that superior
officers who act as convening authorities are essential to justice and discipline in the armed forces. 258 Superior officers are responsible for the good
order and discipline of those they command. 259 In order to ensure good order and discipline, a commander must ensure that justice is done within his
command; otherwise, he will quickly lose the respect of his subordinates. 260
When officers are removed from the military justice system, it effectively allows commanders to shirk their duty to maintain good order and discipline. 261 Worse yet, if a commander cannot resolve what subordinates

255. 10 U.S.C. § 865(d)(3)(B).
256 . See id . §§ 865–866.
257 . See, e .g ., Schlueter, supra note 6, at 227 (discussing why the 2013 limitations on convening authorities’ posttrial powers should be abrogated).
258 . Id . at 227–28 (arguing that convening authorities are necessary to the military justice process, and therefore the 2013 reforms should be abrogated and other proposals to limit
or eliminate convening authority power should be rejected).
259 . Id . at 207 (“In considering any proposed reforms regarding the role of commanders,
it is critical that Congress recall that the primary function and purpose of the military justice
system is to enforce good order and discipline in the armed forces.”).
260. As Senator Lindsay Graham stated, “When you are in the military and you find out
someone has stolen from another member of the unit, and you are all living together on top of
each other, side by side, that is a very big deal, and the commander responsible for that unit
needs to make sure something happens fairly.” 160 CONG. REC. S6588 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
261 . Id .; see also Andrew S. Williams, Safeguarding the Commander’s Authority to Review
the Findings of a Court-Martial, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 471, 484 (2014); Schlueter, supra note 6, at
207.
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perceive as clear injustices, servicemembers lose faith in the military justice
system. 262 Such consequences ultimately undermine good order and discipline. 263
The second premise is that, absent full convening authority discretion,
the military justice system lacks adequate safeguards for military defendants. 264 Even after the 2016 reforms, servicemembers receive fewer protections than civilians. For instance, a member panel is comprised of eight
members selected by the convening authority, and the panel does not need
to return a unanimous verdict. 265 Expansive convening authority review provides a key safeguard against these procedural deviations. 266
The proposed reform responds to both premises. First, the suggested revision discourages arbitrary action while simultaneously allowing convening
authorities to publicly remedy errors. 267 In consequence, the proposed reform not only promotes justice within the military justice system, but it also
promotes the perception that the military justice system is just. And, as the
critics of the 2013 and 2016 reforms noted, both the promotion of justice
and the appearance of justice facilitate good order and discipline. 268
While the proposed reform does not deal with the military justice system’s procedural deviations, the proposed reform coupled with CCA review
provides a formidable backstop against legal errors. The proposed reform

262. 160 CONG. REC. S6588 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (statement of Sen. Graham).
263. Jeremy D. Broussard, Restoring Balance to the Scales: Higher Panel Quorums and
Voting Requirement in Light of Article 60 Restrictions, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2016, at 5, 14 (quoting
Richard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice: An Introduction by the Judge Advocate General, REPORTER, Summer 2010, at 4) (noting that good order and discipline necessitate trust in
the military justice system); see also LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE
ISSUES 5 (2010).
264 . See generally Williams, supra note 261 (arguing that the lack of procedural safeguards in the military justice system necessitate the convening authority’s power of posttrial
review).
265. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, sec. 5161,
§ 816, 130 Stat. 2000, 2897 (2016); id . sec. 5235, § 852, 130 Stat. at 2916. In a case that involves
the possibility of death, the law demands a unanimous finding of guilty. Id . The 2001 Report on
the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice stated, “There is no aspect of military criminal procedures that diverges further from civilian practice, or creates a greater impression of improper influence, than the antiquated process of panel selection.” WALTER T.
COX III, GUY R. ABBATE, JR., MARY M. CHEH, JOHN S. JENKINS & FRANK J. SPINNER, NAT’L
INST. OF MIL. JUST., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 7 (2001), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law
/pdf/Cox-Commission-Report-2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8FF-4Q2D].
266 . See generally Williams, supra note 261 (discussing the necessity of maintaining convening authority posttrial discretion based on the lack of procedural safeguards in the military
justice system). Though Colonel Williams’s article was written prior to the 2016 reforms, the
author’s arguments remain relevant.
267 . See supra Section III.A.
268 . See, e .g ., Baker, supra note 89, at 81 (“[T]he perpetrator of an offense and/or the victim are generally known to the unit, and however large the unit, everyone knows or at least has
a perception about when and whether ‘justice has been done.’ ”).
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maximizes both the convening authorities’ and CCAs’ expertise. Convening
authorities and staff judge advocates oversee the entirety of the court-martial
process and are best positioned to understand the practical effects of legal
errors on the defendant. 269 Such on-the-scene knowledge allows them to
quickly identify legal errors and properly tailor remedies. 270 The CCAs, on
the other hand, are further removed from the process; consequently, they are
in the best position to make major legal decisions such as overturning a verdict based on lack of evidence. 271
CONCLUSION
Together, the 2013 and 2016 changes to the UCMJ created new barriers
to obtaining relief for military servicemembers who were harmed by legal
errors in their prosecutions. The proposed revision to the UCMJ facilitates
the fundamental goal of the military justice system: to provide efficient and
effective procedures while promoting justice and maintaining good order
and discipline. 272 Without such a reform, servicemembers will continue to
face a system that provides them fewer due process rights than civilian defendants yet prevents them from remedying the inevitable violations that result. Until the military justice system eliminates legal errors (a fanciful
proposition) or becomes fully civilianized (a result that may not be desirable), convening authorities must have the power to review courts-martial for
legal errors and provide proper remedies.

269 . See supra Section III.A.1; see also Williams, supra note 261, at 504–05 (suggesting
that the convening authority is better suited to review courts-martial findings and sentences
than the CCAs).
270. Williams, supra note 261, at 509 (“[The commander] brings a unique perspective
and competence to the process. Like the accused, the commander also has a great stake in the
case . . . . The commander’s sense of responsibility is thus greater and more pronounced than
what can be felt by any military appellate judge or court of criminal appeals, which has no ties
to the command.”).
271. Murphy, supra note 225, at 158–59. But see Williams, supra note 261, at 506–08
(suggesting that the CCAs struggle when reviewing verdicts for legal sufficiency and are not
properly structured to make factual determinations).
272. MCM 2019, supra note 10, at I-1 (3. Nature and Purpose of Military Law).

